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Abstract
The notion of Universal Designated Verifier Signature
(UDVS), introduced by Steinfeld et al. in Asiacrypt 2003,
allows any holder of a signature to convince any desig-
nated verifier that the signer indeed generated the sig-
nature without revealing the signature itself, while the
verifier cannot transfer the proof to convince anyone else
of this fact. Such signature schemes can protect the pri-
vacy of signature holders and have applications in certi-
fication systems. Very recently, as pointed out by Baek
et al. in Asiacrypt 2005, one significant inconvenience of
all existing UDVS schemes is that they require the des-
ignated verifier to create a public key using the signer’s
public key parameter and have it certified to ensure the
resulting public key is compatible with the setting that
the signer provided. This is unrealistic in some situations
where the verifier is not willing to go through such setup
process. Baek et al. introduced the concept of Univer-
sal Designated Verifier Signature Proof (UDVSP) to solve
this problem. In this paper, we first introduce the idea of
identity-based (ID-based) UDVSP system. Furthermore,
we point out that the algorithm “Signature Transforma-
tion ST ” of the UDVSP defined by Baek et al. can be
eliminated, which results in a more efficient UDVSP sys-
tem. We present two ID-based UDVSP systems based on
bilinear pairings, and provide the security proofs of our
systems in the random oracle model.
Keywords: Bilinear pairings, identity-based systems, uni-
versal designated verifier signature proof
1 Introduction
There are a plenty of researches on the conflict between
authenticity (non-repudiation) and privacy (controlled
verifiability) in the digital signatures. Undeniable sig-
nature, introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen [5], is
such a kind of digital signature which enables the signer
to decide when his/her signature can be verified. In some
applications, it is important for the signer to decide not
only when but also by whom her signature can be veri-
fied. For example, the voting center presents a proof to
convince a certain voter that his vote was counted with-
out letting him to convince others (e.g., a coercer) of his
vote, which is important to design a receipt-free electronic
voting scheme preventing vote buying and coercion. This
is the motivation of the concept of Designated Verifier
Signature (DVS) [10]. The signer can provide a proof to
convince the designated verifier that he indeed signed a
message. However, the designated verifier cannot present
the proof to convince any third party because he is fully
capable of generating the same proof by himself.
Steinfeld et al. [14] introduced the concept of Uni-
versal Designated Verifier Signature (UDVS), which can
be viewed as an extended notion of DVS. UDVS allows
any holder of the signature (not necessarily the signer)
to designate the signature to any desired designated veri-
fier. The verifier can be convinced that the signer indeed
generated the signature, but cannot transfer the proof to
convince any third party of this fact. UDVS can protect
the privacy of signature holders and have applications in
certification systems. Recently, Lipmaa et al. [11] pointed
out some security flaws of some DVS schemes and pre-
sented a new stronger security notion for DVS.
Very recently, as pointed out by Baek et al. [4] in Asi-
acrypt 2005, one significant inconvenience of all existing
UDVS schemes is that they require the designated verifier
to create private/public key pairs using the same public
key parameter that has been set by the signer and have
been certified. This is unrealistic in some situations, for
example, the verifier have created his/her certified pri-
vate/public key pairs using the public key parameter dif-
ferent from that of the signer. We argue that the verifier
will be less likely to create another certified private/public
key pairs using the public key parameter set by the signer
just only to verify a signature of the signer because this
key setup involving Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) may
incur significant cost. Baek et al. introduced the concept
of Universal Designated Verifier Signature Proof (UD-
VSP) to solve this problem. UDVSP also achieves all the
properties of UDVS. The main difference between UDVS
and UDVSP is that in UDVS the signature holder himself
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provides a proof using the verifier’s public key to convince
the verifier that the signer indeed generated the signature,
while in UDVSP the signature holder performs an inter-
active protocol together with the verifier to convince him
of the fact. The verifier’s key pair will not be involved in
such a proof, even the verifier need not have a key pair
in UDVSP. Therefore, UDVSP is a good substitute for
UDVS in some applications.
Steinfeld et al.’s UDVS schemes [14, 15] were con-
structed under certificate-based (CA-based) public key
systems. Identity-based (ID-based) systems [13] simplify
key management procedure and can be a good alternative
for CA-based systems, especially when efficient key man-
agement and moderate security are required. Zhang et al.
[16] proposed the concept of ID-based UDVS, where the
public key of the user is his/her identity. However, it is
also required that the designated verifier creates the cer-
tified public/private key pair using the same public key
parameter as that of the signer. That is to say, the sig-
nature holder uses the verifier’s public key (identity) to
generate a proof to convince that the signer indeed gen-
erated a signature, which can be verified by the signer’s
identity and the verifier’s private key.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we first introduce
the concept of ID-based UDVSP. Our contribution is two
folds: 1. We provide a formal model and security no-
tions for ID-based UDVSP and then propose a concrete
construction of ID-based UDVSP based on Hess signa-
ture. We prove our construction achieves the desired se-
curity notions in the random oracle model. 2. We point
out that the algorithm “Signature Transformation ST ” of
the UDVSP defined by Baek et al. [4] can be eliminated,
i.e., we can present a more efficient UDVSP system. We
then present an efficient ID-based UDVSP system based
on Cha-Cheon signature scheme and provide the formal
security proof.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Some pre-
liminaries are given in Section 2. The formal definition
and security notions for ID-based UDVSP are given in
Section 3. The proposed ID-based UDVSP system based
on Hess signature and its security analysis are given in
Section 4. In Section 5, we propose a more efficient UD-
VSP system and extend it to ID-based one. Finally, con-
clusions will be made in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose
order is a prime q, and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group
of the same order q. Let a and b be elements of Z∗q . We
assume that the discrete logarithm problems (DLP) in
both G1 and G2 are hard. A bilinear pairing is a map
e : G1 ×G1 → G2 with the following properties:
1) Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab for all P, Q ∈
G1, a, b ∈ Zq.
2) Non-degenerate: There exists P and Q ∈ G1 such
that e(P, Q) 6= 1.
3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to com-
pute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G1.
Definition 1. Computational Diffie-Hellman Prob-
lem (CDHP): Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1, as well
as aP, bP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b ∈ Zq), com-
pute abP .
Definition 2. Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem
(DDHP): Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1, as well as
aP, bP, cP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ Zq), to
decide whether c ≡ ab mod q.
We call G a gap Diffie-Hellman group if DDHP can be
solved in polynomial time but there is no polynomial time
algorithm to solve CDHP with non-negligible probability.
Such groups can be found in supersingular elliptic curve
or hyperelliptic curve over finite field, and the bilinear
pairings can be derived from the Weil or Tate pairings.
For more details, see [1, 6, 8].
Throughout the rest of this paper we define G1 be a
cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a
prime q, and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the
same order q. A bilinear pairing e : G1×G1 → G2. Define
three cryptographic secure hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ →
G1, H1 : G1×{0, 1}
∗ → Z∗q and h : {0, 1}
∗×G2 → Z
∗
q×Z
∗
q .
Definition 3. One More Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem: The definition of “One More Discrete Logarithm”
(OMDL) problem is introduced by Bellare [3]. Formally,
the experiment for this problem can be described as follows
[4]:
• Experiment: Let SP = (q, P, e, G1, G2, k) be the
system parameters. A polynomial-time attacker
A makes m queries to the challenge oracle C()
and n queries to the DL oracle DLq,P (). Let
(s1, s2, · · · , sn)←− A
C(),DLq,P ()(SP ).
• Output: If (gs1 = h1) ∧ · · · ∧ (g
sm = hm), where
h1, · · ·hm are random points in G1 output by the chal-
lenge oracle C(), and n < m, where n denotes the
number of queries to the DL oracle, then return 1.
Otherwise, return 0.
We say that OMDL problem is hard if the advantage of
A in the above experiment is negligible in k.
2.2 ID-based Setting from Pairings
The ID-based public key cryptosystems allow some public
information of the user such as name, address and email
etc., rather than an arbitrary string to be used as his
public key. The private key of the user is calculated by
PKG (Private Key Generator) and sent to the user via a
secure channel.
ID-based public key setting from bilinear pairings can
be implemented as follows:
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• Setup: PKG chooses a random number s ∈ Z∗q and
set Ppub = sP. The center publishes systems param-
eters params = {G1, G2, e, q, P, Ppub, H}, and keep s
as the master-key, which is known only by himself.
• Extract: A user submits his/her identity informa-
tion ID to PKG. PKG computes QID = H(ID), and
returns SID = sQID to the user as his/her private
key.
3 ID-based Universal Designated
Verifier Signature Proof
3.1 Definitions
There are four parties involved in the ID-based UDVSP
system: a PKG, a signer, a designator (signature holder),
a designated verifier. The PKG first generates the private
key for the signer. The signer then signs a message and
securely transmits the resulting signature together with
the message to the designator. After obtained the valid
signature from the signer, the designator creates a trans-
formed signature by generating a random mask and hiding
the original signature using it. The designator then con-
vinces the designated verifier via an interactive protocol
that the transformed signature has been generated from
the valid signature obtained from the signer.
Definition 4. (ID-based UDVSP:) An ID-based UD-
VSP system consists of the following five polynomial-time
algorithms and a proof:
• System Parameters Generation PG: On input
a security parameter k, outputs the common system
parameters Params and the master-key mk of PKG.
• Key Extraction KE : On input Params, master-key
mk, and a user’s identity information ID as the pub-
lic key pk, outputs the corresponding private key sk.
• Signature Generation SG: On input the secret key
sks of the signer S and a message m, outputs a sig-
nature σ on m.
• Signature Verification SV: On input the public
key pks = IDs, the message m and the signature σ,
outputs either accept or reject.
• Signature Transformation ST : On input the pub-
lic key pks of S, the signature σ and a secret mask
s̃k, outputs a transformed signature σ̃ using s̃k.
• Interactive Verification Protocol VP: This is an
interactive verification protocol between a signature
holder SH and a designated verifier DV . Common
inputs for SH and DV are the signer’s public key
pks, a transformed signature σ̃ and the message m.
SH’s private input is the secret mask s̃k used to cre-
ate σ̃. DV does not have any private input. In this
protocol, SH tries to convince DV that σ̃ has been
generated from the valid signature σ obtained from
the signer, with the knowledge of s̃k. The output of
the protocol is either accept or reject.
3.2 Security Requirements
There are two essential requirements for ID-based UD-
VSP system. One is that a signature created by the signer
should be existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen
message attack and ID attack. This is similar to the prop-
erty of “PV-Unforgeability” in UDVS scheme [14]. The
other is resistance against impersonation attack. That is,
UDVSP system should prevent an attacker who does not
hold a valid signature created by the signer from imper-
sonating the honest designator who holds a valid signature
created by the signer [4].
This impersonation attack can be divided into two cat-
egories, “Type-1” and “Type-2” attacks. In Type-1 at-
tack, an attacker who has obtained a transformed signa-
ture participates in the VP protocol as a cheating desig-
nated verifier and interacts with an honest designator a
number of times. The attacker then tries to impersonate
the honest designator to other honest designated verifier.
In Type-2 attack, the attacker simply ignores the trans-
formed signature that he has obtained before but tries to
create a new transformed signature on his own and use
this to impersonate the honest designator to an honest
designated verifier in the VP protocol. About the for-
mal definition for security against the Type-1 and Type-2
attacks, please refer to [4].
In UDVSP system, the property of “DV-
Unforgeability” [14] is not considered, which requires
that it is difficult for an attacker to forge a DV-signature
σ̃∗ by the signer on a new message m∗, such that the pair
(m∗, σ̃∗) passes the DV-verification test. This prevents
attacks to fool the designated verifier, possibly mounted
by a dishonest designator. However, we remark that this
attack can be included in the Type-2 attack, if we think
the dishonest designator (attacker) impersonates himself
to fool the honest designated verifier.
4 ID-based UDVSP System Based
on Hess Signature
4.1 The Proposed System
Our proposed ID-based UDVSP system is based on Hess
signature scheme [9]. Each sub-algorithm and protocol of
this system can be described as follows:
• System Parameters Generation PG: On input a
security parameter k, outputs the system parameters
Params = {G1, G2, e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, H1} and the
PKG’s master-key mk = x.
• Key Extraction KE: On input Params, the master-
key x, and an identity information ID, outputs the
corresponding private key SID = xH(ID).
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• Signature Generation SG: On input the secret
key SIDs of the signer, a message m and a random
element Q ∈R G1, the signer computes r = e(Q, P ),
(λ, µ) = h(m, r), and V = λSIDs + µQ. Outputs a
signature σ = (r, V ) on m.
• Signature Verification SV: On input the pub-
lic key IDs, the message m and the signature σ.
Let (λ, µ) = h(m, r), if the equation e(V, P ) =
e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ holds, outputs accept; other-
wise, output reject.
• Signature Transformation ST : On input the
signer’s public key IDs, the signature σ and a ran-
dom integer z ∈R Z
∗
q , outputs a transformed signa-
ture σ̃ = (r, V ′ = zV ) and the secret mask s̃k = z.
• Interactive Verification Protocol VP: Both SH
and DV firstly compute (λ, µ) = h(m, r), ω1 =
e(V ′, P ), and ω2 = e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ. They then
perform the following interactive protocol:
1) SH chooses a random integer α ∈R Z
∗
q and
sends a = ωα2 to DV .
2) DV chooses c ∈R Z
∗
q and sends it to SH .
3) SH computes t = α + cz mod q and sends t to
DV .
4) DV checks ωt2
?
= aωc1. If the equation holds,
outputs accept; otherwise, outputs reject.
The underlying signature scheme in the above ID-
based UDVSP system is a standard Hess signature, so
e(V, P ) = e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ holds. Also, in the pro-
tocol VP, note that ω1 = e(V
′, P ) = e(V, P )z = ωz2 ,
therefore the equation ωt2 = ω
α+cz
2 = aω
c
1 holds.
4.2 Security Analysis
We prove that our proposed ID-based UDVSP system
achieves the desired security properties. Since the un-
forgeability of the Hess signature scheme [9] was proven
under the assumption that CDHP in G1 is hard, we only
analyze the security of the UDVSP system under the im-
personation attacks.
Theorem 1. The ID-based UDVSP system based on Hess
signature is secure against impersonation under Type-
1 attack in the random oracle model [2] assuming that
OMDL problem is hard in G1.
Proof. Let A = (Ṽ , P̃ ) be an impersonator that tries
to break the UDVSP system based on the Hess signa-
ture and B be an OMDL attacker. Suppose B is given
the system parameters {G1, G2, e, q}. First, B queries its
challenge oracle C to obtain a challenge point S0 = s0P
for some unknown s0 ∈R Zq. B then randomly chooses
an integer x ∈R Zq and outputs the signer’s public
key pk = {G1, G2, e, q, P, Ppub = xP, IDs, H, h}, where
H : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 and h : {0, 1}
∗×G2 → Z
∗
q×Z
∗
q are hash
functions viewed as random oracles.
Let the signed message is m, B randomly chooses four
integers d, e, λ, µ ∈R Zq and sets H(IDs) = dP , r =
e(P, P )e, and h(m, r) = (λ, µ). B then computes V ′ =
(λxd + µe)S0 and sends A a transformed signature σ̃ =
(r, V ′).
B proceeds to simulate n times of the execution of the
VP protocol between Ṽ and an honest designator P as
follows:
Make a query to C and get the response Si, here i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n}. Compute ai = e((λxd + µe)P, Si) and send
it to Ṽ . When Ṽ sends ci, make query Si+ciS0 toDLq,P ()
to get the response ti. Ṽ checks (e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ)ti
?
=
aie(V
′, P )ci .
Note that ai = (e(dP, Ppub)
λe(P, P )µe)si =
(e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ)si , and ti = si + cis0 mod q, we
have
(e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ)ti = (e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ)si+cis0
= ai(e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ)cis0
= aie((λxd + µe)S0, P )
ci
= aie(V
′, P )ci
After performing the above simulation n times, B
now attempts to extract s0. To do so, B runs P̃
to get a in Step 1 of VP protocol, selects c ∈R
Zq and runs P̃ to obtain its response t and checks
(e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ)t
?
= ae(V ′, P )c. If so, B runs P̃
again with the same state as before but with differ-
ent challenge c′ ∈R Zq, obtains its response t
′ and
checks (e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ)t
′ ?
= ae(V ′, P )c
′
. If so, we
have (e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ)t−t
′
= e(V ′, P )c−c
′
, that is
e(P, P )(λxd+µe)(t−t
′) = e(P, P )(λxd+µe)s0(c−c
′). Then we
obtain s0 =
t−t′
c−c′
mod q. With s0, we can compute all si
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
Theorem 2. The ID-based UDVSP system based on Hess
signature is secure against impersonation under Type-2
attack in the random oracle model assuming that CDHP
is hard in G1.
Proof. Let A be an impersonator that tries to break
the ID-based UDVSP system based on Hess signature
under Type-2 attack. Let B be a forger that tries to
break the Cha-Cheon signature scheme under chosen
message attack. Suppose the B is given a public key
{G1, G2, e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, h}, where H : {0, 1}
∗ →
G∗1 and h : {0, 1}
∗ × G2 → Z
∗
q × Z
∗
q are hash func-
tions viewed as random oracles. Firstly, B outputs pk =
{G1, G2, e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, h} as the signer’s public
key. B then chooses an arbitrary string m ∈ {0, 1}∗.
B now runs A to get σ̃ = (r, V ′), continues to run
A to get a in step 1 of VP. Upon receiving a, B picks
c ∈R Z
∗
q , runs A to obtain its response t and checks
(e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ)t
?
= ae(V ′, P )c. If the equation
holds, B runs A again with same state as before but
with difference challenge c′, obtains its response t′ and
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checks (e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ)t
′ ?
= ae(V ′, P )c
′
. If the equa-
tion holds, B outputs (r, V ′
c−c′
t−t′ ) as a forgery.
Note that e(V ′, P )c−c
′
= (e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ)t−t
′
, we
have
e(V ′
c−c′
t−t′ , P ) = e(H(IDs), Ppub)
λrµ.
Therefore, (r, V ′
c−c′
t−t′ ) is a valid Hess signature on message
m.
5 More Efficient ID-based UD-
VSP System
We observe that the algorithm “Signature Transformation
ST ” defined in [4] can be eliminated, i.e., we can present
a more efficient UDVSP system. In this section, we first
present the definition and the security notions for the new
more efficient UDVSP system, and then extend it to ID-
based one.
5.1 The New Definition and Security No-
tions
The new efficient UDVSP system only consists of three
polynomial algorithms and a proof: PG, SG, SV , and
VP. As an example, we present the following UDVSP
system based on BLS signature scheme [1]:
• System Parameters Generation PG: On input
a security parameter k, outputs the system param-
eters Params = {G1, G2, e, q, P, H}. Let the signer’s
private/public key pair be (x, y = xP ).
• Signature Generation SG: On input the secret
key x of the signer, and a message m, outputs the
signature σ = xH(m) on m.
• Signature Verification SV: On input the public
key y, the message m and the signature σ. If the
equation e(σ, P ) = e(H(m), y) holds, outputs accept;
otherwise, output reject.
• Interactive Verification Protocol VP: The des-
ignator (SH) performs an interactive protocol with
the designated verifier as follows:
1) SH chooses a random element R ∈R G1 and
sends a = e(R, P ) to DV .
2) DV chooses c ∈R Z
∗
q and sends it to SH .
3) SH computes T = R + cσ and sends T to DV .
4) DV checks e(T, P ) = ae(H(m), y)c. If the equa-
tion holds, outputs accept; otherwise, output
reject.
Compare with Baek et al.’s UDVSP system based on
BLS signature scheme, our UDVSP system not only elim-
inates the algorithm of ST , but also improves the effi-
ciency of VP.
For the secure requirements, we still consider the two
type of impersonation attacks. In Type-1 attack, an at-
tacker participates in the VP protocol as a cheating des-
ignated verifier and interacts with an honest designator a
number of times. The attacker then tries to impersonate
the honest designator to other honest designated verifier.
In Type-2 attack, the attacker just create a new proof
to impersonate the honest designator to an honest desig-
nated verifier in the VP protocol.
Note that VP in our system is indeed a pairing-
based honest verifier zero-knowledge proof [7] derived
from Schnorr signature scheme [12], which ensures DV
that SH knows the information of σ. Furthermore, due
to the property of pairings, σ must be the form of xH(m).
Therefore, even the Type-1 attacker interacts with an
honest designator a number of times, he can not know
any useful information to impersonate the honest desig-
nator to cheat an honest designated verifier. It means
that the advantage for Type-1 attacker to impersonate
the honest designator is same to that of Type-2 attacker.
So, in the following, we just consider the Type-2 attacker.
5.2 Efficient ID-based UDVSP System
Based on Cha-Cheon Signature
In the following we follow the above definition to present a
new ID-based UDVSP system based on Cha-Cheon signa-
ture scheme [6]. We argue that we can give such a system
based on other ID-based signature schemes. Each sub-
algorithm and protocol of this system can be described as
follows:
• System Parameters Generation PG: On input a
security parameter k, outputs the system parameters
Params = {G1, G2, e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, H1} and the
PKG’s master-key mk = x.
• Key Extraction KE: On input Params, the master-
key x, and an identity information ID, outputs the
corresponding private key SID = xH(ID).
• Signature Generation SG: On input the secret
key SIDs of the signer, a message m, and a random
integer r ∈R Z
∗
q , the signer computes U = rH(IDs),
V = (r + H1(U ||m))SIDs . Outputs a signature σ =
(U, V ) on m.
• Signature Verification SV: On input the public
key IDs, the message m and the signature σ, if the
equation e(V, P ) = e(U + H1(U ||m)H(IDs), Ppub)
holds, outputs accept; otherwise, outputs reject.
• Interactive Verification Protocol VP: Both SH
and DV perform the following interactive protocol:
1) SH chooses a random integer Q ∈R G1 and then
sends a = e(Q, P ), U to DV .
2) DV chooses c ∈R Z
∗
q and sends it to SH .
3) SH computes T = Q + cV and sends T to DV .
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4) DV checks e(T, P )
?
= ae(U +H1(U ||m)H(IDs),
Ppub)
c. If the equation holds, outputs accept;
otherwise, output reject.
The underlying signature scheme in the above ID-
based UDVSP system is a standard Cha-Cheon signa-
ture, so e(V, P ) = e(U + H1(U ||m)H(IDs), Ppub) holds.
Also, in the protocol VP , note that e(T, P ) = e(Q +
cV, P ) = ae(V, P )c, therefore the equation e(T, P ) =
ae(U + H1(U ||m)H(IDs), Ppub)
c holds.
5.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 3. The ID-based UDVSP system based on Cha-
Cheon signature is secure against impersonation under
Type-2 attack in the random oracle model assuming that
CDHP is hard in G1.
Proof. Let A be an impersonator that tries to break
the ID-based UDVSP system based on Cha-Cheon sig-
nature under Type-2 attack. Let B be a forger that
tries to break the Cha-Cheon signature scheme under
chosen message attack. Suppose the B is given a pub-
lic key {G1, G2, e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, H1}, where H :
{0, 1}∗ → G∗1 and H1 : G1 × {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗q are hash
functions viewed as random oracles [2]. Firstly, B out-
puts pk = {G1, G2, e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, H1} as the
signer’s public key. B then chooses an arbitrary string
m ∈ {0, 1}∗.
B now runs A to get (a, U) in step 1 of VP. Upon re-
ceiving a, B picks c ∈R Z
∗
q , runsA to obtain its response T
and checks e(T, P )
?
= ae(U +H1(U ||m)H(IDs), Ppub)
c. If
the equation holds, B runs A again with same state as be-
fore but with difference challenge c′, obtains its response t′
and checks e(T ′, P )
?
= ae(U + H1(U ||m)H(IDs), Ppub)
c′ .
If the equation holds, B outputs (U, 1
c−c′
(T − T ′)) as a
forgery.
Note that e(T − T ′, P ) = e(U + H1(U ||m)H(IDs),
Ppub)
c−c′ , we have e((c − c′)−1(T − T ′), P ) = e(U +
H1(U ||m)H(IDs), Ppub). Therefore, (U,
1
c−c′
(T − T ′)) is
a valid Cha-Cheon signature on message m.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we first provide a formal model and se-
curity notions for ID-based UDVSP and present a con-
crete construction based on Hess signature. Meanwhile,
we argue that the algorithm “Signature Transformation
ST ” of the UDVSP defined by Baek et al. can be elim-
inated, which results in a more efficient UDVSP system.
We then present an efficient ID-based UDVSP based on
Cha-Cheon signature scheme. Also, we prove our con-
structions achieve the desired security notions in the ran-
dom oracle model.
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